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FOREWORD 
During the last five years IIASA has played an important role in reviving the long 
wave debate which has almost been forgotten since the works of Kondratieff, Schumpeter 
and others. IIASA initiated contacts among the various groups throughout the world 
working in this area and organized four international conferences that  addressed the ques- 
tions of long term technological changes and economic growth. Although IIASA did not 
have a project on this specific topic a number of research activities within the Technology, 
Economy and Society (TES) Program are very closely related t o  the issues of long term 
development and cyclical phenomena. 
This paper analyzes the procesa of technological change over the last two hundred 
years from the perspective of structural transformations in energy, transport and infrae- 
tructures as they are related t o  the fluctuations in long term development. I t  shows that  
both the diffusion of new technologies and the periods of accelerated economic growth are 
not homogenously distributed in time but rather in recurring clusters. It  is posaible t o  
distinguish periods of structural changea that  are accompanied by the saturation of old, 
and the introduction of new, technologies and periods of economic expansion and 
widespread diffusion of new technologies. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented a t  the third long wave meeting which 
was jointly organized by IIASA and CRPEE - Facultk de Droit e t  des Sciences 
Economiques, University of Montpellier, France. 
F .  Schmidt-Bleek 
Leader 
Technology, Economy & Society Program 
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Dynamics of Change and Long Waves 
"Evolution i s  the result of a sequence of 
replacements." Elliott W. Montroll, 1978 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the long wave debate centers around the existence of empirical evidence and 
possible explanations for the phenomenon, but even those who claim that  such long-term 
fluctuations in economic life are real, argue whether the waves and their timing are regular 
and t o  what extent various events are synchronized. We will argue that  the long wave 
phenomenon is one particular way of describing technological, economic and social change, 
and development. We show that this evolutionary development process is the result of a 
sequence of replacements of one technique (technology, artifact, product, practice, 
organization, tradition or idea) by another. 
Long waves emerge because a number of important replacements take place 
simultaneously, leading to  a prolonged phase of economic growth. Likewise, these 
replacements and growth processes tend to saturate during relatively short periods 
resulting in prolonged recession, economic restructuring, and technological and social 
change. It is during these periods that  innovations cluster and eventually lead to  a new 
"wave" of replacements and growth. This hypothesis does not require a high degree of 
synchronization or "focusing" for either the innovation clusters or for the saturation 
clusters. Instead, it is sufficient that a number of important replacements take place during 
the periods of prolonged growth. 
Denoting the time interval that  it takes to replace from 10 to  90 percent of old 
practice or technique by At ,  all that is required is that the Ats  overlap for a number of 
important substitutions. This requirement implies a certain degree of clustering of 
saturations and innovations, but the clusters need not be sharply focused during the 
troughs of the long wave. In fact, they are initiated during the end of the growth phase, 
which is followed by a period of turbulence when the first important replacements start 
saturating, and last well into the beginning of the upswing phase marked by a new pulse of 
replacements. This view of the long wave is also consistent with Kleinknecht's observation 
that  innovation clusters can be observed around the troughs. However, they do not appear 
t o  be so strongly focused' as originally maintained by Mensch (see Mensch 1979, and 
Kleinknecht 1987 and his contribution to  this conference). We will show that important 
technologies saturate around the troughs and, more importantly, that  the time intervals 
covered by their Ats  encompass prolonged periods of growth and expansion. Long wave 
pulsations (flares) in prices will be used as an indicator of the various phases, especially the 
sequence of growth and recession phases. 
On the basis of our assumptions, the dynamics of change and economic growth can be 
decomposed into a sequence of replacements that generate periods of growth followed by 
recession. These are marked by turbulence caused by the lagged saturation of the 
replacement processes. Innovations eventually lead to  a new phase of replacements and 
thus also growth. The innovations should not be viewed in the narrow technical sense, 
because they also include new social and organizational forms and ideas, and creation of 
new practices. At the aggregate level, e.g. physical output or gross national product 
(GNP), the indicators portray long-term increases interrupted by phases of turbulence. In 
other words, the  aggregate indicators look like step functions where each step is a plateau 
with large fluctuations, and the periods of growth between the plateaux are S-shaped 
curves. Due t o  the inaccuracy of the data  and the inherent difficulty of identifying exact 
resolutions of different phases in the long waves, we will use a number of different 
indicators simultaneously t o  describe technological and economic changes. 
We will use both physical indicators, such as energy consumption or length of 
transport infrastructures, and monetary indicators, such as prices or output a t  given prices. 
A large number of indicators gives a higher precision in identifying growth pulses, 
replacements of old by new, and various phases in the long wave. This higher precision is 
reached in the statistical sense and same way as a large number of synchronized clocks will 
give a better time measurement than a single one does (official time is in fact measured by 
an average). Thus, the multi-dimensional approach increases the accuracy of the results in 
spite of often insufficient data quality, especially for the records from last century or before. 
Another reason for analyzing a number of different indicators for the same time 
periods and same processes of change (e.g. energy, transport, prices) is that  not all can be 
described by the same secular patterns. For example, prices often portray fluctuations, 
some of them with relatively long periods, but rarely increasing or decreasing secular trends 
of more than a few decades. Growth and senescence of technologies or consumption levels, 
on the other hand, often have consistent secular trends with very long duration (compared 
with the long wave). Usually, the secular trend of growth and senescence processes can be 
described by S-shaped (often logistic) curves. However, not a[l can be described by simple 
(or single) S-shaped functions. Sometimes more complex patterns are observed, which are 
often described by envelopes that  can be decomposed into a number of S-shaped growth or 
senescence phases. 
Two typical cases are successive growth pulses with intervening saturation and a 
period of change, and simultaneous substitution of competing technologies. We are arguing 
that  (1) the population, production or performance of inanimate (man-made) objects or 
systems can be described by successive growth pulses that  often have a S-shape, the same 
shape encountered in the growth of populations, "organisms", etc. as originally described by 
Verhulst (1844) and Pearl (1924); and (2) that  these growth pulses can be decomposed into 
a sequence of replacements, originally exploited by Fisher and Pry (1971) as the 
appropriate model for the dynamics of industrial replacements, and later extended to 
simultaneous replacement of more than two competing technologies (Marchetti and 
Nakicenovic, 1979). In the first case, successive S-shaped pulses usually represent, for 
example, the growth of energy consumption or successive improvements in performance, 
such as aircraft speed records. Here the first pulse is associated with an old technology, the 
piston engine, and the second with the new technology, the jet engine (see N. Nakicenovic, 
1987a). In the second case, simultaneous substitution of competing technologies is usually 
described by increasing market shares of new technologies and decreasing market shares of 
old technologies, such as the replacement of sails by steam and later by motor ships. 
Thus, we will describe the dynamics of change and the long waves with a number of 
different indicators (that is by vector rather than by scalar measurements). Usually an 
asymmetrical view is offered, either by using price or physical (technological) indicators as 
explanatory variables. Our description is not frozen into one or the other view, but rather 
we offer an symmetrical description by considering many dimensions of these dynamic 
processes. 
First we will illustrate the waves (flares) in prices. Second, we will show that the 
expansion of the most important means of transportation, starting with canals and ending 
with aircraft, can be seen as a replacement process where the substitution of older by newer 
technologies overlaps the growth phases in the long wave. This analysis starts, somewhat 
unconventionally, with the youngest technologies (aircraft and airways) and ends with the 
oldest (canals and waterways). Finally, we will show that the evolution of the energy 
systems and steel production also follows a similar pattern where important replacement 
processes take place during the growth phases of the long wave. Ln addition, we will show 
that total global production of energy and steel evolved through two growth pulses that are 
related to the last two long waves. Throughout the text we will use the price flares as an 
clock for the long waves. 
PRICE WAVES 
The regularity of fluctuations in price data was the phenomenon that first stimulated 
Kondratieff and his predecessors to postulate the existence of long waves in economic life. 
These waves are most pronounced in the wholesale price indices for all commodities in the 
United States, but they can be observed in the price indices of other industrialized 
countries including the United Kingdom. Figure 1 shows the wholesale price index in the 
United Kingdom from 1560 to 1982 and Figure 2 in the United States from 1800 to 1982. 
In both countries prices appear to be stationary with long fluctuations almost over the 
whole historical period. Only after the 1940s can a pronounced inflationary trend be 
observed that had a magnitude greater than any other fluctuation before. In the United 
States prices reached pronounced peaks around the years 1780, 1815, 1865 and 1920, and 
there were also sharp increases during the last decade. In the United Kingdom, the 
fluctuations were subdued until the end of the eighteenth century. The first pronounced 
peak occurred around the year 1810, a weaker but prolonged peak around the year 1872, 
another pronounced peak in 1920 and a prolonged inflationary period during the last 
decade. Since all pronounced inflationary periods in both countries are associated with 
major wars, Hartman and Wheeler (1979) observed that the absence of strong inflation in 
the mid-nineteenth century United Kingdom could be partly due to  the absence of such 
military conflict. 
Clearly, price fluctuations in the United Kingdom and the United States display a 
broadly similar pattern, although the behavior in the United States prior to the mid- 
eighteenth century is not well documented and is uncertain. Prices in the United Kingdom 
portray a long decline from 1660 to  about 1740 with two pronounced peaks in 1699 and 
1710, and a long rise from about 1740 to about 1810, followed by another decline. The 
turning point between these two periods of rising and falling prices corresponds to  the first 
pronounced peak. Especially large price rises occurred between 1785 and 1792 as the 
Industrial Revolution gained momentum. In the United States, a pronounced price peak 
occurred during the Revolution and the recovery period between 1775 and 1785. Although 
the two countries differed substantially in many respects such as the level of 
industrialization, institutional development, energy use, internal conflicts, etc., the parallel 
in the pattern of price fluctuations through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is 
Percent 
Figure 1 Wholesale Price Index, UK.  
Porcont 
Figure 2 Wholesale Price Index, US. 
striking. In the face of quickened industrialization, the Napoleonic Wars (UK) and the 
War of 1812 (US), prices rose until the 1820s. A period of declining trend continued 
through 1850 (UK) and 1843 (US), followed by a rising trend which was more pronounced 
in the United States, undoubtedly associated with the Civil War. The period from 1873 to  
1896 is characterized by a declining trend in both countries and the succession of rising and 
falling periods has remained almost exactly parallel until the present. Since the Second 
World War, prices in the United Kingdom and the United States have risen almost 
uninterruptedly and to  unprecedented levels. 
The price fluctuations in both countries indicate a regular and parallel pattern as will 
be elaborated shortly. Price peaks of the 17809, 18209, 18709, and the 19209 are spaced a t  
intervals of four to  five decades. These recurring long swings in prices are in our opinion 
not the primary causes of the long wave phenomenon but rather a good indicator of the 
succession of aIternating phases of the long wave. We consider the long swings in price 
movements to indicate the phases of rapid growth and saturation with the increasing level 
of prices and phases of recession, and regenerative destruction with decreasing price level 
(see Schumpeter 1939). 
In order t o  obtain a clearer picture of the timing of the long waves that  are observable 
in the price indices of the two countries, we have decomposed the time series into 
fluctuations and a secular trend. Since the secular trend does not indicate a simple 
functional form, we have used a fifty-one year moving average method for its elimination 
from the time series. We have smoothed the resulting residuals (i.e., the relative difference 
between the actual price level and its secular trend expressed as a percentage) with a fifteen 
year moving average. The resulting stationary series (smoothed and unsmoot hed residuals) 
are shown on the lower plots in Figure 3 for the United Kingdom and in Figure 4 for the 
United States. The upper plots in Figures 3 and 4 show stylized indicators of the long 
swings in prices. The curves have been derived by smoothing the residuals by a twenty-five 
(instead of a fifteen) year moving average. We have chosen such a long moving average in 
order to  eliminate some of the more pronounced fluctuations from the residuals that  
overlap the five-decade long swings. The stars approximately indicate the turning points of 
the long waves. We are aware that  this kind of simple smoothing can introduce spurious 
fluctuations into the time series. 
This empirical determination indicates not only a parallel development of the price 
movements in the two countries, but also a high degree of synchronization. For the period 
before 1800 in the United Kingdom, we dated turning points in the years 1623, 1651, 1681, 
1712, 1739, 1753 and 1773. The intervals between the four succeeding troughs are 58, 58 
and 44 years and between the three peaks 61 and 41 years. As the Industrial Revolution 
gained momentum, first in the United Kingdom and later in the United States, the long 
swings became more regular and the magnitude of the fluctuations increased. The average 
amplitude of the fluctuations rose from less than ten percent in the preindustrial United 
Kingdom to about twenty percent in both countries. Table 1 shows the dates of the 
turning points and the duration of the long swings in prices for the two countries. The 
average duration of the fluctuations is about fifty years and the occurrence of peaks and 
troughs varies by not more than one or two years. We consider Table 1 as a rough, 
empirical indicator of the timing of long waves in the two leading countries. This timing is 
similar to  the stylized schemes derived by van Duijn, 1983 and Bieshaar and Kleinknecht, 
1984. In subsequent examples we will use this empirical indicator of the long wave turning 
points to  determine the correspondence between the fluctuations that we will establish in 
other monetary and quantitative indicators of economic development. 
Figure 3 Long Wave in Wholesale Prices, UK. 
Figure 4 Long Wave in Wholesale Prices, US. 
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Table 1 Chronology of the Long Wave, UK and US. 
Price Swings 
United Kingdom United States 
Phase Period Duration Period Duration 
Downswing 1585- 1623 48 
Upswing 1623-1651 28 
Downswing 165 1-168 1 30 
Upswing 1681-1712 3 1 
Downswing 1712-1739 27 
Upswing 17341753 24 
Downswing 1753-1773 20 
Upswing 1773-1810 37 
Downswing 1810-1840 30 18041841 32 
Upswing 1840- 1869 29 1841-1869 28 
Downswing 18641895 26 1864 1895 26 
Upswing 1895- 1920 2 5 1895- 1920 2 5 
Downswing 1920-1945 2 5 1920-1945 2 5 
Upswing 1945- 1945- 
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
Aircraft 
We will now show that  the evolution of transport systems and infrastructures can be 
analyzed as a sequence of replacements of old models of transportation by new ones. 
Furthermore, the substitutions of old by new technologies overlap the growth phases in the 
long wave fluctuations as indicated by price flares. The analysis starts, somewhat 
unconventionally, with the youngest transport system (air travel) and ends with the oldest 
(canals and waterways). 
The rapid expansion of air travel during the recent decades has its roots in 
developments achieved in aerodynamics and other sciences many decades ago, and 
especially in the engineering achievements made between the two wars. The DC-3 airliner 
is often given as the example of the first "modern" passenger transport because in many 
ways it denotes the beginning of the "aircraft age". The use of aircraft for transportation 
has increased ever since and their performance has improved by about two orders of 
magnitude. Figure 5 shows the increase in air transport worldwide measured in billions of 
passenger kilometers per year (pass-km/yr). It gives all carrier operations including those 
of the planned economies. The logistic function has been fitted to  the actual data,  and it 
indicates that  the inflection point in the growth of air travel occurred about ten years ago 
(1977). Thus, after a period of rapid exponential growth, less than one doubling is left 
until the estimated saturation level is achieved after the year 2000. The figure shows that  
1 One general finding of a large number of studies is that many growth proceases follow characteristic S 
shaped curves. Logistic function is one of the most widely applied Sshaped growth curves m d  is given by: 
z/(c-z)=exp(al+P), where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, a ,  /3 and 
R are constants, z 1s the actual level of growth achieved, while R-z is the amount of growth still to be 
achieved before the (usually unknown) saturation level rc is reached. Taking logarithms of both tides gives 
the left side of the equation t o  be expressed aa a linear function of time so that  the secular trend of a 
logistic growth process appears aa a straight line when plotted in this way. Substituting f = z / ~  in the 
equation, expresses the growth process in terms of fractional share f of the asymptotic level K reached, i.e. 
the equation becomes: f/(l-n=exp(at+/3). 
the  most rapid expansion of air travel in the world lasted from the 1930s up until the 1970s 
and that  the growth rate has been declining for about the past ten years. Therefore, air 
travel expanded in much the same way as growth processes do in biology as S-shaped 
growth patterns. The most rapid expansion of air travel took place during the growth 
phase of the long wave. 
Figure 6 shows the same data and fitted logistic curve transformed as z/(rc-z), where 
z denotes the actual volume of all operations in a given year and n is the estimated 
saturation level. The data and the estimated logistic trend line are plotted in Figure 6 as 
fractional shares of the saturation level, f = z l n ,  which simplifies the transformation to 
f / ( l - f ) ,  Transformed in this way, the data  appear to be on a straight line which is the 
estimated logistic function. 
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Figure 6 Air Transport Worldwide, Logistic Plot. 
Perhaps the most interesting result is that  it took about 30 years for world air 
transport to reach the inflection point (half of the estimated saturation level) and that alter 
two decades the saturation level will be reached. This raises a crucial question. What will 
happen after saturation? Can we expect another growth pulse, a decline, or the instability 
of changing periods of growth and decline? Most likely a new period of growth associated 
with new technologies will follow the projected saturation (see also Lee and Nakicenovic, 
1987). 
During the same period, while air travel worldwide increased by two orders of 
magnitude, the productivity of the individual aircraft also increased by two orders of 
magnitude from the DC-3 to the Boeing 747 (see Nakicenovic 1987a). Another growth 
phase of air travel, or some other new transport system, in the next century would require 
an analogous increase in the productivity of the vehicles. In the case of aircraft this would 
imply either supersonic, hypersonic, extremely large transports, or both. 
How probable is the development of a large cruise supersonic or hypersonic transport? 
S-pulses do not usually occur alone but in pairs. Usually structural change occurs at the 
saturation level, leading to a new growth pulse and in turn to  new productivity and 
performance requirements for succeeding technologies. This logic would suggest the need 
for a more productive means of long distance transportation for the next century than the 
current wide-bodied families of subsonic aircraft offer. It is questionable whether history 
repeats itself, but we will show that in the past each growth phase of the long wave is 
associated with the evolution of a number of important technologies that  tend to  saturate 
during the end of the prosperity phase and during the recession phase of the long cycle. 
Below we illustrate that  the growth of the older technology, road transport systems, in the 
United States can be described by a pair of successive growth pulses with an intervening 
saturation during the 1930s marked by a period of change. Due to  the data  available, we 
illustrate the evolution of road vehicles and other transport systems in the United States, 
but will return to  analyzing long waves and technological change a t  the global level 
thereafter. 
Automobiles 
At the beginning of this century, few proponents of the automobile envisaged that its 
use would spread so rapidly throughout the world. As a commercial and recreational 
vehicle, the motor car offered many advantages over other modes of transportation, 
especially animal-drawn vehicles. Perhaps the most important advantage was the 
possibility of increasing the radius of business and leisure transport. 
The most rapid expansion of the automobile was witnessed in the United States. It 
had a relatively late start  in relation to European countries, such as France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom). According t o  the records, four motor vehicles were used in the 
United States in 1894. This was followed, however, with an impressive expansion of the 
automobile fleet: 90 in 1897; 8,000 in 1900; almost half a million ten years later, and more 
than one million after another two years. Thus the United States quickly surpassed the 
European countries both in production and in the number of vehicles in use. 
Figure 7 shows the rapid increase in the number of cars used in the United States. It 
also shows that  the expansion of the automobile fleet is characterized by two distinct 
secular trends, with an inflection in the 1930s followed by less rapid growth rates. Since 
the two secular trends on the curve appear to  be roughly linear on the logarithmic scale, 
the automobile fleet evolved through two exponential pulses. Thus, in this example, the 
growth of the automobile fleet did not follow a simple, single Sshaped growth pulse. 
The working hypothesis here is that  the two trends indicate two different phases of 
the dissemination of motor vehicles in the United States. The first characterizes the 
substitution of motor vehicles for horse-drawn vehicles and the second the actual growth of 
road transport after animal-drawn vehicles essentially disappeared from American roads. 
Thus the first expansion phase was more rapid since it represents "market takeover" or 
substitution of older means of transport, whereas the second represents the actual growth 
of road vehicle fleets and their associated infrastructure, such as highway systems. The 
inflection point that connects the two growth pulses coincides with the prolonged recession 
in the long wave cycle. Thus our hypothesis implies that the motor vehicle fleets evolved 
differently in the two adjacent Kondratieff cycles. 
Figure 7 Number of Automobiles and Road Horses (and mules), US. 
The lack of historical records as to  the exact number of horse-drawn vehicles in the 
United States soon after the introduction of the automobile in 1895 makes it difficult to  
describe accurately the assumed substitution of the motor car for the horse during the first, 
more rapid expansion phase of the motor vehicle fleets. The number of draft animals (road 
horses and mules) and the automobiles given in Figure 7 are therefore a rough 
approximation of this substitution process. Figure 8 gives fractional market shares of 
horses and cars in all road vehicles (sum of horses and cars). Market shares, j, are plotted 
on a semilogarithmic plot transformed as j/l- j, as a ratio of the market shares of one 
technology over the other since fractional market shares always sum to  one. 2 
Figure 8 indicates that  the automobile replaced animal-drawn road vehicles during a 
relatively short process and proceeded along a logistic path. Motor vehicles achieved a one 
percent share of road vehicles shortly after 1900 and a 50 percent share in 1916. A 
complete takeover occurred in 1930 when there were 0.3 million road horses and mules and 
2 One general finding of a large number of studies is that substitution of an old technology by a new one, 
expressed in fractional terms, follows characteristic Sshaped curves. Fisher and Pry (1971) formulated a 
simple but powerful model of technological substitution by postulating that  the replacement of an old by a 
new technology proceeds along the logistic growth curve: 
//(I- f )=exp(af+P),  where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, a and P 
are constants, t 18 the fractional market share of the new competitor, while 1-/is that of the old one. 
Figure 8 Substitution of Horses by Cars, US. 
23 million cars, an increase from less than 2 million cars ten years earlier. Thus the 
inflection point in the growth of the automobile fleet from Figure 7 actually coincides with 
the end of the replacement of animal-drawn road vehicles by motor cars and explains the 
apparent saturation in the growth of motor vehicles observed by many analysts during the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. This perceived saturation marks the beginning of a new phase 
in the motorization of America, with growth rates comparable to  those of the expansion of 
horse-drawn vehicles before the automobile age. Seen from this perspective, the growth in 
the number of all road vehicles increased from 1870 to 1930 but from 1900 to 1930 the 
automobiles replaced the horses, whereas after the total replacement, only the  c a n  were 
expanding during the last long wave. In most of the European countries, the  rapid 
expansion of the automobile also started during the last Kondratieff wave. In this example 
we see two aspects in the dynamics of technological change: the growth of technological 
populations, in this case road vehicles, and the replacement of older by newer technological 
species. Figure 9 shows the growth in the number of all road vehicles as a continuous 
growth process with an apparent saturation level of about 350 million vehicles after the 
year 2030 and a At equal to  about 100 years. Because the growth of road transport in 
3 We define At as the time elapsed between the achievement of one and 50 percent of the saturation level K ,  
i.e. in this example At = 95.5 years. Due to  the symmetry of the logistic function, the same time is 
required for the increase from 50 to 99  percent of the saturation level. An alternative definition of At is the 
Figure 9 All Road Vehicles in Use, US. 
general and the substitution of automobiles for horse-drawn carriages and wagons overlap 
in time, together they produce two growth trends in the growth of the automobile fleet 
with an inflection point in the 1930s making the structural change in the composition of the 
road vehicle fleets. Therefore, this example illustrates that  during each of the last two 
growth phases of a long wave, road vehicle fleets developed differently. One tentative 
conclusion from this example could be that the further development of road vehicles could 
take another new path after the 19908. 
The expansion of the road vehicle fleets in the United States and and the growth of 
the global air travel illustrate two important aspects of technological and economic change. 
The  expansion of air travel was shown aa a S-shaped growth pulse. This example parallels 
growth processes in biology, for example growth of a leaf or bacteria population. The 
replacement of horses by cars shows substitution of an old by a new technology as an S- 
shaped increase in market shares of the new competitor. 
time elapsed between the achievement of 10 and 90 percent level. In this case At would be slightly 
different from the other definition, but for all practical applications both definitions can be used 
interchangeably. 
We have argued that  during each expansion phase of the long wave a number of 
important technologies are developed simultaneously, growing, replacing old ones and 
usually enhancing each other. Road transport systems require, in fact, elaborate and 
sophisticated infrastructure. The development of road transport vehicles (and 
infrastructure) illustrates the succession of replacements of old by new as one of the basic 
features of the  development process. Furthermore, i t  shows that  the different replacement 
processes are associated with the two long waves. Thus we have seen that the expansion of 
automobiles in the United States and global air travel took place during the growth phase 
of the last long wave, whereas the replacement of horses by cars was a feature of the 
previous long wave when railroads were the dominant form of transport in most of the 
developed world. Railroads are now in the post-saturation phase; their position as a means 
of passenger travel is being eroded in most of the industrialized countries and has become 
insignificant in the United States. A symbol of this decay is the discontinuation of the 
transcontinental railway service in the United States. 
Transport I n f r a s t r u c  tures 
Both air and road transport systems require elaborate infrastructures. In fact, 
airports and railroads were obviously constructed for the sole purpose of providing 
infrastructure for aircraft and trains. However, this distinction is not so clear for roads, 
although we have shown that  the construction of surfaced roads preceded the expansion of 
the automobile fleet. This similarity in the evolution of the transport systems is perhaps 
indicative of an  invariance in the development process of transport systems and their 
underlying infrastructure. A serious problem arises, however, when comparing railroads 
and roads to  other transport systems that  do not depend exclusively on the rigid, man- 
made links between them. Airways and waterways, for example, rely less on man-made 
links between the nodes because they use the natural environment (air, rivers, coastal 
waters). Nevertheless, they require an elaborate infrastructure, such as airports, harbors 
and canals. Thus it is difficult to  compare the total length of the implicit air- and 
waterway routes with the total length of the main railroad tracks and surfaced roads. As 
an approximation in the analysis of the evolution of transport infrastructures, we will use 
the sparse accounts and probably inaccurate estimates about the construction of canals as 
an indicator for the total network of the waterway transport systems. Figure 10 shows the 
length of the three successive transport infrastructures: canals, railroads and surfaced 
roads. In the United States the first canals were built during the 1780s but in fact, canal 
construction really accelerated during the first decades of the 19th Century, making that  
period the "canal era". They expanded very rapidly to  about 2,000 miles until 1831, when 
13 miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad went into operation. Thus the canal era 
lasted until the railways became the main mode of long distance transport a decade later. 
From this point of view, the 1830s were turbulent years: many turnpikes were abandoned; 
canal construction was reaching its peak; and important early railway projects were already 
completed. Figure 10 shows that  the railroads remained the longest transport network up 
until 1920, when they were surpassed by the rapidly expanding road system and the 
automobile. The  construction of railroads saturated during the following decade and has 
been decreasing ever since. This is analogous to  the saturation of canals during the 1840s 
and their decline thereafter. Figure 10 shows that  the evolution of the transport 
infrastructure can be seen as a succession and replacement of older by newer transport 
systems, although a t  any given time more than two systems were actually in operation. 
This succession of the three transport infrastructures can be described in terms of 
three S-shaped growth pulses that  are given together with the estimated logistic curves in 
Figure 11. Seen as successive growth pulses, the expansion of canals saturated during the 
1860s a t  a level of about 4,000 miles and the expansion of railroads during the 1930s, a t  a 
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Figure 10 Length of Transport Infrastructures, US. 
level of about 300,000 miles, whereas roads will saturate during the coming years. Thus, 
the three transport systems saturated successively a t  intervals of about six decades. 
Figure 12 shows the same growth pulses transformed so that  the data  and the S-curve 
appear as a straight line. This indicates that the development of canals was much quicker 
(with a At of about 30 years) than the expansion of railroads and roads (with a At of 54 
and 56 years, respectively). Thus, canals have a time constant comparable to  that of 
airways. 
The difference in the time constant between air and inland water transport systems, 
on the one hand, and rail and road transport on the other, indicates that a t  least a t  this 
level of comparison transport systems having more extensive infrastructures may take 
longer to expand, and possibly to complete the whole life cycle from growth to saturation 
and later senescence. Thus, i t  is remarkable that in spite of these differences, the 
saturation in the growth of these three infrastructures coincides with the beginning of the 
prolonged recessions in the last three long waves. 
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Figure 11 Growth of Infrastructures as Fraction of Saturation, US. 
To  assess whether the time constants are really different, Figure 13 shows the 
s~~ccessive substitutions of the three transport infrastructures and the federal airway route 
miles. The substitution process is shown as relative market shares (n of a given transport 
infrastructure to the total length of all of the infrastructures together. From this 
perspective the substitution of the four systems over time appears as a regular process. 
4 The fractional rharer ( 4  are not plotted directly but a~ the linear transportation of the logirtic curve, i.e. 
f/(l-4 - in thin more general c u e ,  aa the ratio of the market rhare taken by a given energy rource over the 
rum of the market rha ra  of all other competing tranrport infraatructurer. Thir form of prerentation reveab 
the logirtic rubrtitution path aa an almort linear secular trend with rmall annual perturbations. Thnr, the 
presence of mme linear trendr in Figure 0 indicate8 where the fractional rubrtitution of tranrport infraatruc- 
turer followr a logirtic curve. 
In dealing with more than two competing technologier, we murt generalise the Firher and Pry model, rince 
in much caaer logirtic rubrtitution cannot be prererved in all phiwr of the rubrtitution procew. Every com- 
petitor undergoer three dirtinct rubrtitution phaaea: growth, maturation and decline. Thir ir illurtrated by 
the rubrtitution path of rail trackr, which curvea through a maximum from increasing to declining market 
rharer (see Figure 0). In the model of the rubrtitution procm, we w u m e  that only one competitor ir in the 
maturation phaae at any given time, that declining technologier fade away rteadily at logirtic rater and that 
new competiton enter the market and grow at logirtic rater. h a rerult, the maturating technology is left 
with the reridual market rharer (i.e., the difference between 1 and the rum of fractional market sharer of all 
other competiton) and is forced to follow a nonlogirtic path that joins itr period of growth to itr rubrequent 
period of decline. After the current, maturating competitor haa reached a logirtic rate of decline, the next 
oldest competitor enten its maturation phaae and the procesr ir repeated until all but the moat recent com- 
petitor are in decline. A more comprehenrive description of the model and ~ r u m p t i o n r  ir given in Naki- 
cenovic (1979). 
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Figure 12 Growth of Infrastructures as Fraction of Saturation, Transformed. 
This result may appear to contradict the earlier observation that the total length of 
railway tracks and surfaced roads took longer to construct than wa=ter and airway routes. 
In fact, the timetable associated with the substitution dynamics of infrastructural length is 
surprisingly consistent in relation to  the duration of growth pulses of the four transport 
modes during the past 180 years. The apparent inconsistency results from the different 
ways of measuring the growth rates and life cycles of the respective infrastructures. In the 
case of market shares the increase in a particular transport infrastructure is analyzed in 
terms of the length of all networks. Thus, even the rapid growth rate of airway route 
mileage is translated into a comparatively long time constant because a t  the same time the 
total length of all transport networks is also growing rapidly. As a result of these rapid 
growth rates, the share of surfaced roads has been declining since the 19709, whereas the 
total length of surfaced roads is still growing toward the ultimate saturation level. 
Thus, the total length of a transport infrastructure (in this case, canals, railroads and 
surfaced roads) can still be growing even decades away from ultimate saturation and final 
senescence, while the share of its length in all transport infrastructures is declining. The 
saturation and decline of market shares therefore precede saturation in absolute growth in a 
growing market, meaning that  in those cases the eventual saturation of any competing 
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Figure 13 Substitution of Transport Infrastructures, US. 
technology can be anticipated in the substitution dynamics. 
This description of the evolution of transport systems and infrastructures shows that 
during each growth phase of the last three long waves one of the important transport 
systems developed in the United States. Thus, Schumpeter's association of the last three 
long waves with canals, railroads and the automobile can be confirmed from the empirical 
point of view. 
STEEL AND ENERGY 
Steel Production 
A widely accepted view is that the iron and steel industry constitutes one of the more 
mature sectors of developed economies and one of the most important sectors in the 
developing countries. In other words, iron and steel production is approaching or already 
has reached saturation and is declining in the industrialized countries, but it is still growing 
in most of the developing world. Subsequently, the iron and steel industry worldwide is in 
different phases of development, ranging from the early development and expansion phase 
to  that of maturity and decline. We will attempt to give empirical evidence for this broad 
and long-term development of global steel production. In his contribution to  this 
conference Grubler will analyze specific changes of individual countries and technologies in 
greater detail (Grubler 1987). 
Metallurgy dates back to  the dawn of human civilization, but because metals were 
precious, wood, stone and sometimes bones were the dominant materials to  help accomplish 
a difficult task. In spite of a wider and more sophisticated use of metals (initially mostly 
copper and bronze, and later also iron and some steel) the use of traditional materials 
prevailed through antiquity and the Middle Ages. The voracious use of iron and steel 
evolved parallel with the so-called Industrial Revolution. Figure 14 illustrates the 
enormous increase in steel production worldwide since 1860. Production and growth has 
been especially rapid since the end of World War 11, increasing from about 160 million tons 
to  more than 850 million tons in less than four decades. Figure 14 also shows wide 
fluctuations in steel production during the 19209 and 19309 and again during the last 
decade. 
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Figure 14 Global Steel Production (Griibler, 1987). 
This enormous increase in steel production is due to the crucial role that  materials 
have in the development of industrial societies. The precise details of this strong coupling 
between economic development in general and materials in particular is truly complex, but 
the basic reason is actually obvious and transparent - the effectiveness and design of 
machines, equipment and infrastructure depends to a substantial degree on the materials of 
which they are made. The discussion about the development of transport infrastructures 
illustrated this point very vividly: successive replacements of turnpikes, canals, railways, 
roads and airways paralleled major improvements in construction materials from wood and 
stone t o  iron, steel and concrete, and during recent decades to  more advanced alloys and 
materials. 
The introduction of better quality materials was instrumental for the development of 
new manufacturing techniques, energy sources and transport systems. Metallurgy, 
manufacturing, energy and transport all developed due to  numerous cross-links as one 
improvement or breakthrough made another possible and sometimes necessary. It so 
happens that  during the last two centuries iron and steel were perhaps the most critical of 
all widely-used materials. While stone and wood continued to  be important materials, the 
advent of steam, railroads and the coal "age" would not have been possible with wood and 
stone. In fact, a more efficient technology for producing high quality steel was required, 
and after a series of major innovations ranging from the substitution of charcoal by coke to  
new casting methods, it culminated in the invention of the Bessemer steel process in 1857. 
Figure 15 shows the simplified representation of the technological changes in steel 
production since 1860, starting with puddle steel as the oldest production method and 
ending with electric arc steel. Figure 15 shows the fractional market shares ( of the five 4 competing steel technologies transformed as f / ( l -  f)  on a semilogarithmic plot. 
In spite of the very different nature of the five steel production technologies, their 
chemistry, energy sources, share of scrap iron, etc., they all appear to  be in competition 
with each other, the newer technology eventually displacing the older. The linear trends 
indicate where the replacement of old by new technologies followed logistic curves. 
Griibler (1987, contribution to  the conference) will show that  the same historical trend can 
be observed in most of the industrialized countries. The replacement of crucible and puddle 
steel was a very fast process, whereas the open hearth method developed into the dominant 
steel technology over many decades. Bessemer became the dominant steel technology 
during the 1870s and thereafter its importance declined, while the open hearth process 
expanded. From the 1870s to 1950 most of the increase in global steel production was 
achieved by the improvements and expansion of the open hearth method. The electric arc 
steel process was introduced during the 1920s and its market share is still expanding with 
increasing amounts of recycled steel in the total production. After 1950 basic oxygen steel 
expanded vigorously, but now its relative contribution to  steel production is saturating. 
Thus, we have identified three distinct phases in the evolution of steel technologies. 
The first ended with the swift introduction of Bessemer steel, the first industrial process 
that  could achieve high quality and large-scale production of steel. The second is congruent 
with the development of the open hearth steel process and the third marks the expansion of 
electric and basic oxygen methods. Another way of describing this succession of 
replacements in the evolution of the steel industry is to  decompose the aggregate steel 
production (from Figure 14) into appropriate development phases. Figure 16 shows total 
steel production (from all five technologies) in per capita terms as two distinct S-shaped 
5 As in Figure 13, the fractional shares ( n  are not plotted directly but as the linear transformation of the 
logistic curve, i.e. //(I-n - as the ratio of the market share taken by a given steel technology over the sum 
of the market shares of all other competing technologies. Also in this figure, this form of presentation 
reveals the logistic substitution path as an almost linear secular trend with annual perturbations. The 
presence of some linear trends in Figure 15 indicates where the fractional substitution of steel technologies 
follows a logistic curve. 
Figure 15 Steel Substitution, World (Griibler, 1987) 
growth pulses. The first starts with the dominance of the Bessemer method and mirrors 
the expansion of the open hearth process, while the second starts with the introduction of 
the electric arc process and accelerates with the expansion of basic oxygen steel. 
Figure 17 shows the same growth pulses transformed so that the two S-shaped curves 
appear as straight lines. Transformed in this way, the two pulses appear as parallel lines 
indicating equal duration of the two pulses with a At of about 45 years. The two pulses 
overlap during the period of highest turbulence indicating that another period with large 
fluctuations in per capita (and therefore total) steel production may have started. These 
two pulses coincide with the growth phases of the last two long waves (see the rough 
timing for the long waves in the United Kingdom and the United States given in Table 1 
above). Figure 18 shows that in addition to  broad fluctuations in the wholesale prices, the 
prices of iron and steel also show pronounced Bares during the depression years in these 
countries. Thus, the iron and steel prices reflect important structural changes in the global 
steel industry. 
6 Transformation / / ( I - / ]  is used where f = Z / K ,  K ia the estimated saturation level and z the steel 
production in a particular year, ao that f represents the fraction of the saturation. 
Figure 16 Global Per Capita Steel Production (Griibler, 1987). 
This example conFirrns our original hypothesis that each growth phase of the long 
wave cycle is associated with the expansion of a number of important new technologies 
through successive replacements of the old ones. Furthermore, the evolution of transport 
infrastructures and steel technologies are very regular replacement processes, but the 
saturation of dominant technologies does not correspond exactly to  the timing of the 
depression phases in the long wave. Instead, the saturation periods are more dispersed in 
time so that  some occur before the depression years (e.g. canals in the United States) and 
some a t  the beginning of the upswing (e.g. saturation of open hearth steel in North America 
and West Europe). 
Energy Consumption 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, fuelwood, agricultural wastes, and 
mechanical wind and water power supplied most of the inanimate energy in addition to 
animal and human muscle power. We have seen that  a considerable infrastructure of roads 
(turnpikes) and canals was in place for timber and later coal transport, although the 
widespread use of coal became possible with the emergence of railroads. Thus, like today, 
the use of energy in the early industrial development phase also depended on the transport 
system, and energy was one of the more important components of goods transported on 
Figure 17 Global Per Capita Steel Production, Transformed (Griibler, 1987). 
Figure 18 Irons and Steel Price Indices, UK and US (Griibler, 1987). 
turnpikes, canals, waterways and railroads. The development of energy and materials, and 
in  particular steel technologies, is related in the same way as energy and transport systems. 
Better fuels made better steel processes possible, while higher quality metals were crucial in 
further improving the whole energy system. 
Fuelwood represented most of the commercial primary energy inputs during the last 
century. Figure 19 shows the annual consumption of fuelwood, fossil and nuclear energy 
sources in the world since 1860. Data are plotted on a semilogarithmic scale and show the 
exponential growth p h ~  in consumption by piecewise linear trends. 
Figure 19 Global Primary Energy Consumption. 
Since the beginning of the century the consumption of fuelwood a t  the global level has 
declined as a commercial energy source, although it is still used widely, especially in the 
developing world. With the expansion of railroads and the steel industry, as well as the 
application of steam in general, the use of coal increased exponentially until the 19109 when 
a new, less rapid growth phase started. Since their introduction in the 19709, oil and 
natural gas have been consumed a t  even more rapid rates. In fact, oil and natural gas 
curves have the same slope and thus almost identical growth rates; they are shifted in time 
by about 15 years. The increased use of oil and natural gas paralleled the growth of the 
petrochemical and electrical industries, and the expanded use of internal combustion and 
electric prime movers. Because nuclear energy is still in its early phase of development, the 
steep growth of the last two decades may not indicate the possibility of rapid expansion in 
the future. During the last few years, the growth of nuclear energy has declined worldwide 
to  more moderate rates. 
Primary energy consumption (including fuelwood) increased exponentially a t  an 
average growth rate of about two percent per year. The decline of older energy sources was 
more than compensated for by the rapid growth of the new ones. Thus, energy systems, 
like transport infrastructures and steel processes, evolved through a sequence of 
replacements of old by new technologies, practices and methods. Figure 20 shows the 
primary energy substitution process in t e r m  of the fractional shares ( f )  held by each of the 
five energy sources in total consumption and plotted as //(I-n on a semilogarithmic scale. 
Figure 20 Global Primary Energy Substitution. 
Compared to the substitution of transport infrastructures and steel technologies, the 
replacement of energy sources is a remarkably regular process. The  slopes of the linear 
segments in the substitution process (logistic curves) are nearly the same, indicating that  
all four older energy sources have almost the same A t  of about 100 years. Furthermore, 
the market shares do not reflect important historical events such as the world wars - the 
long-term trends are remarkably stable. 
Based on these historical trends we have used a scenario to  project nuclear energy 
shares into the  future. We have assumed the same slope as the expansion of oil and natural 
gas, implying a five percent market share by the year 2000. This indicates the possibility 
of a larger growth of nuclear energy in the next century, but also means very few additions 
to  the  current generating capacity during the next decades. 
Coal saturated during the 1920s and oil during the 1980s. This again corresponds well 
to the  timing of the last Kondratieff cycle. The growth phase up until the 1920s is 
characterized by the expansion of coal, railroads, and the iron and steel industries, while 
the next growth pulse corresponds to  the expansion of oil, the petrochemical industry, 
electricity and road transport. These two growth pulses can be seen more explicitly a t  the 
aggregate level in total energy consumption. Figure 21 shows the per capita global primary 
energy consumption divided into two growth pulses that  reflect the substitution of primary 
energy sources. The first one was initiated with the rapid expansion in coal consumption 
after the 1 8 6 h  and ends during the Second World War, by which time coal's share curved 
into a phase of decline. The second pulse is initiated with the onset of coal saturation and 
the beginning of the oil expansion phase (oil surpassed fuelwood in 1925) and accelerated 
after both fuelwood and coal were in decline. This second growth pulse is apparently 
nearing completion as the oil market shares in primary energy saturate. 
Figure 21 Per Capita Global Energy Consumption (Crubler, 1987). 
Figure 22 shows the same growth pulses transformed so that  the two S-shaped curves 
appear as straight lines. In this way the differences between the two growth pulses are 
more clear. The At of the first pulse is longer than 60 years whereas it is shorter than 40 
years for the second one. In contrast to  this asymmetry the two growth pulses in per 
capita steel production had almost identical slopes and a At of about 45 years (see 
Figure 17). In spite of these obvious differences between the energy and steel pulses, the 
analogy of the two processes is very strong and their timing almost identical. In fact, the 
deviations of the actual growth pulses from the estimated logistic curves show almost 
identical patterns. Fluctuations are strong a t  the beginning of the pulses until more than 
10 percent of the saturation level is reached and they increase again above the 50 percent 
level. This result indicates that  in addition to  the regular pattern in the substitution of old 
by new technologies during each of the last two long waves, energy and steel use evolved 
through equivalent growth pulses that are concurrent with the upswing phases of the two 
last waves. 
Figure 22 Per Capita Global Energy Consumption, Transformed (Griibler, 1987). 
7 Transformation / / ( I - f )  is used where / =  z/rc, rc is the estimated saturation level and z the energy 
consumption in a particular year, so that /represents the fraction of the saturation. 
ENERGY AND PRICES 
The above description of the complex process of technological and economic change is 
obviously incomplete. Certainly, there are many other, perhaps better ways of describing 
the dynamics of transport infrastructures, steel production and energy consumption. The 
intriguing aspect of the replacement dynamics and price fluctuations is that they appear to 
be interwoven with regular features and related to both the invariant pattern of 
substitution dynamics and long waves in economic life. To show that this is not a feature 
unique to the last two long waves, we will show similar congruence in replacement 
dynamics of primary energy in the United States and price fluctuations over a period of 
about two centuries. 
Primary Energy 
Energy use is one of the rare quantitative indicators that can, a t  least in principle, be 
compared over long periods of time in spite of many technological changes and 
substitutions of old by new sources of energy. This is possible because the use of different 
energy sources can be expressed in common energy units. Fortunately, it is possible to 
reconstruct the history of the more important sources of energy for the United States since 
1800, since a more complete record of energy consumption exists than for the world. 
Figure 23 shows the annual consumption of fuelwood, fossil energy, mechanical water 
power and hydroelectric power in the United States since 1800. As in Figure 19, data are 
plotted on a semilogarithmic scale and show the exponential growth phases in consumption 
by piecewise linear trends. The growth of total energy consumption was on average about 
three percent per year in the United States. The general pattern in the evolution of the 
energy in the United States, however, is not different from that in the world as a whole. In 
a way this is not surprising since the United States was the largest energy consumer during 
this century. 
Figure 24 shows primary energy substitution in the United States. Mechanical water 
power (mostly water and some windmills) and hydroelectric power are not observable in 
the figure because of their small contribution to total energy supply: they barely exceeded 
the one percent level during short periods and were otherwise under that critical level. 
This shows that the omission of these energy sources due to the lack of data in the example 
of energy substitution at  the global level is probably not too crucial, although the share of 
these noncommercial energy sources must be higher worldwide than in the United States. 
Before the 1820s fuelwood fulfilled virtually all energy needs in the United States. 
Coal entered the competition in 1817 at  the one percent level and up to the 1880s it was 
essentially a two technology market - whatever gains coal made were translated into losses 
for fuelwood. Crude oil and natural gas were first used in the United States a t  the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and both held a one percent market share during the 
1880s. From then on the use of crude oil expanded, and by 1950 the consumption of crude 
oil surpassed that of coal. (Even as late as the 19209, however, the consumption of crude 
oil was not much larger than that of fuelwood.) The use of natural gas surpassed the use of 
coal nine years later. In comparing this period with earlier periods, it is remarkable that 
the structure of energy consumption changed more during the period of oil dominance than 
ever before. 
Natural gas exploration, production and transport significantly indicate different 
trends from oil technologies, Ythough natural gas was associated with the oil industry ever 
since its first commercial use. Nevertheless, most energy accounts bind natural gas to oil 
Figure 23 Primary Energy Consumption, US. 
because of the large production of associated natural gas from oil wells. Except a t  the 
point of production, associated natural gas or oil-technology gas, is indistinguishable from 
gas produced from natural gas wells. The fact that this distinction is difficult to  make, and 
is consequently ignored in historical data,  is to an extent misleading since oil and gas 
technology have portrayed distinctly different trends during the last century. This is 
however not reflected in oil and natural gas consumption given in Figure 23. The 
distinction between associated gas and crude oil ,in terms of primary energy accounting, is 
desirable and is consistent with the tradition of adding city gas produced from oil or coal to 
these primary energy sources rather than to  natural gas. 
In order to  illustrate that natural gas is becoming increasingly decoupled from oil 
technologies, we have attempted to reconstruct the primary energy balances by adding 
associated gas to crude oil and subtracting the same amount from natural gas consumption 
(but leaving net imports with natural gas balances). The revised market shares are given 
in Figure 24. The resulting replacements can be characterized by very regular time 
constants because the historical data are apparently accurate enough to  provide the 
information required for this further analytical resolution. This is possible in the case of 
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Figure 24 Primary Energy Substitution, US. 
primary energy consumption in the United States because associated (oil technology) and 
nonassociated (gas technology) natural gas production is accounted for in the historical 
records. 
This result shows that although associated gas has long been available as a by-product 
of oil, its use does not represent the actual evolution of gas technologies. Figure 24 shows 
that the resulting substitution process improves the regularity to the extent that the time 
constants (Ats) now cluster at  about 70 years for all energy sources and that the saturation 
intervals between coal, oil and gas technologies are all separated by about 50 years. During 
the saturation periods of the dominant energy sources, new ones are introduced. Gas 
technologies are introduced during the saturation of coal, and nuclear energy during the 
saturation of oil. Thus, the evolution of the energy system reflects with perfect symmetry 
the long waves in prices and the associated periods of growth and structural change. 
The slope of the nuclear energy penetration is determined by a scenario to have a At  
of about 70 years by specifying a 10 percent market share by the year 2000. After the 
1990s gas technologies clearly emerge as the most important energy source in the projection 
given in Figure 24. However, the natural gas (gas technology) shares have been below the 
trend line during the last few years while the coal shares have exceeded the projected 
market shares. It remains to  be seen whether this disparity between our projections and 
actual development will be reabsorbed in the coming years like the "under- and 
overconsumption" of coal and oil, compared to trend lines during the 1920s and 1930s, 
which were eventually absorbed. It is conceivable that the de-coupling of oil and gas 
industries may provide a vehicle for wider use of natural gas in the future. 
Although the saturation periods of coal and oil technologies are separated by about 50 
years and during these periods of saturation new energy sources are introduced (gas 
technologies and nuclear energy, respectively), we still have yet to probe further into the 
past to test whether an even older energy source saturated during the previous long wave, 
i.e. during the 1870s. 
Figure 25 shows that  it is possible to  include a partial reconstruction since 1850 of an 
even older energy source in the United States - animal feed. It represents an energy 
equivalent of the amount of food consumed by the working animals (mostly horses and 
mules used in transportation and agriculture). 
Figure 25 Primary Energy Substitution (with Feed), US. 
Animal feed reached its highest market share in the 1880s indicating that draft 
animals provided the major form of local transport and motive power in agriculture in spite 
of the dominance of railroads and steamships as long distance transport modes (see the 
discussion on evolution of transport systems above). It is curious that the feed and oil 
technologies cross in the 19209 as if to suggest the simultaneous substitution of the horse 
carriage and wagon by the motor vehicles (see Figure 8 and Nakicenovic 1987b). 
Figure 25 indicates that  the replacement dynamics can result in a perfect symmetry of 
the successive substitutions of older by newer energy forms, providing a rather complete 
reconstruction of past patterns in energy use. Three emerging saturation periods are 
separated by about 50 years starting with animal feed in the 18809, coal in the 19209, and 
oil technologies during the 1980s. Each economic growth phase that  connects the periods of 
energy saturation and prolonged recession throughout the economy is characterized by the 
expansion of two energy sources, one with large market shares "attacking" the saturating 
energy source and the other just emerging during the periods of saturation and structural 
change in the energy system. Next we will investigate another feature of the evolution of 
energy use in the United States that reflects the long waves in terms of the energy intensity 
of the whole economy. 
Efficiency of Energy Use 
There are many ways of determining the efficiency of energy use. The most obvious 
indicators are the efficiencies of primary energy conversion to  secondary and final energy 
forms. Another possibility is to  estimate the efficiency of energy end-use. Examples 
include the amount of fuel needed for travel or for space conditioning. All of these 
efficiences have improved radically since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution along 
with the introduction of more efficient technologies. In some cases the improvements span 
almost an order of magnitude. For example, in 1920 the average efficiency of natural gas 
power plants in the United States was nine percent, whereas today the best gas turbine 
power plants can operate with efficiences of almost 50 percent. Over longer periods the 
improvements are even more impressive. For example, the second law efficiency of prime 
movers increased by two orders of magnitude since 1700, that  of lamps by almost three 
orders of magnitude during the last century, and so on (see Marchetti, 1979). All of these 
efficiency improvements of individual technologies are translated into more effective uses of 
energy and other materials at  the level of the overall economic activity. Some efficiency 
increases result from improved technologies and others from substitution of the old by new 
technologies. In general, replacement follows when the saturation in additional 
improvements of an established technology is reached. 
The extent of these changes and improvements can be expressed at  an aggregate level 
by the amount of primary energy consumed per unit of gross national product in a given 
year. Figure 26 shows the total primary energy consumption (from Figure 23), per capita 
consumption and the ratio of energy consumption over gross national product (energy 
intensity) for the United States. The average reduction in energy consumed to generate 
one dollar of gross national product was about 0.9 percent per year during the last 180 
years. The ratio decreased from than 10 kilowatt-years per (constant 1958) dollar in 1800 
to  slightly more than two kilowatt-years per dollar in 1982. Thus, a regular decline in 
energy intensity of the whole economy prevailed over a long historical period indicating 
tha t  energy conservation is a historical process that  was discovered as a concept only 
during the last decade. 
Figure 27 shows the fluctuations in energy intensity in the United States after the 
elimination of the secular trend by a 51-year geometric moving average. The fluctuations 
show pronounced long wave movements and a high degree of synchronization with the price 
swings (see Table 1). Figure 28 shows the evolution of energy prices in comparison with 
the wholesale price index from Figure 15 and the heat and lighting price index (the last two 
indices are almost indistinguishable from each other) and in Figure 29 the oil prices are also 
Figure 26 Primary Energy, Gross National Product and Energy Intensity, US. 
shown as an index to indicate the concurrent changes in energy and wholesale prices. 
During the downswings in prices the energy intensity of the economy decreased more 
rapidly and during the upswings less rapidly. This illustrates relatively high energy price 
elasticity since energy prices changed in unison with general price movements as shown in 
Figure 29. This means that  during the downswing in economic activity general 
rationalization measures of individual enterprises cause larger energy savings compared 
with the average historical reductions. 
As the competition intensifies during the recession and depression, energy savings 
become an important factor in cost reduction, also because of generally higher energy prices 
in addition to the overall price inflation. With recovery, new demands and prospects of 
continued economic growth release many pressures associated with saturating markets. 
Price levels are also much lower a t  the beginning of the new growth phase. Most of the 
entrepreneurs in the new growth sectors must intensify their activities in order to meet new 
demands, and low energy intensity ceases to be an important competitive criterion. New 
technologies and energy forms offer possibilities for continued expansion in new markets so 
that  relative energy use intensifies. Toward the end of the prosperity period the growth 
process encounters limits once more. These are reflected in saturating demand and general 
price inflation illustrated by the long wave of wholesale price movements (see Figure 15). 
Thus, during the downswing energy use reductions become important. 
Percent 
Figure 27 Long Waves in Energy Intensity, US. 
These reductions are not only due to  efforts to  cut costs as a reaction to saturating 
demand, but also due to  a host of social constraints. Many energy technologies, along with 
other economic activities, become socially and environmentally unacceptable toward the 
end of prosperity. This means that  some diseconomies that were socially acceptable during 
the growth phase become internalized as additional economic costs or as explicit limits to 
further expansion. These causes of additional costs appear t o  off-set the benefits of the 
economies of scale achieved during the expansion phase. In fact, with the demand 
reductions during the downswing the large capacities that offered economies of scale 
become sources of additional costs as excess capacity. 
The relationship between primary energy consumption patterns and the long wave 
appears to  extend beyond the parallel changes in the per capita level of energy consumption 
and energy intensity with the fluctuations of other long wave indicators such as wholesale 
prices. Comparison of Figures 25 and 27 indicates that  the upper turning points of energy 
intensity fluctuations correspond to  the saturation points of primary energy sources. The 
upper turning point that  occurred in the 1870s is related to the saturation in animal feed 
substitution, the 1915 turning point with the saturation in coal substitution, and the 
turning point of the 1970s with the saturation of crude oil. In addition, new energy sources 
reached one-percent market shares during the times of high energy intensity (during the 
1870s) in 1910 and 1973). Thus, the succession of the long waves indicates a similar timing 
as the dynamics of energy substitution and the changes in steel production and transport 
infrastructures. 
Figure 28 Energy and Wholesale Prices, US. 
Figure 29 Oil, Heat and Lighting and Wholesale Price Indices, US. 
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE 
At the risk of overgeneralizing, we can state that there is strong evidence that 
symmetric or a t  least similar changes in the patterns of energy consumption, steel 
production, transport infrastructures and price niueau occur from one long wave to  another, 
although the historical content and individual manifestations change profoundly so as to  
make the symmetry apparent only a t  the higher level of abstraction. Thus, only patterns of 
change are similar while the symmetry breaks with an attempt to  relate individual events 
that  are always unique to a particular historical situation and thus different from one long 
wave to  another. This is the essence of the analysis presented here - recurring patterns 
emerge as we consider sequences of replacements of old by new technologies, growth pulses 
and deviations from smoothed secular trends. In all three cases the individual distinctions 
are removed from the data. It is the individual distinctions that "condense" the time-series 
to  actual (original) indicators removing the symmetry in patterns among periods of growth 
and periods of saturation and change. 
In order to  understand the actual mechanisms behind the long wave phenomenon and 
changes in technology, economy and society, we must acquire better analytical and 
statistical descriptions of the causal relationships we generally call historical experience. 
This would also imply that we need to  understand the course of specific events and their 
individual manifestations that  led, for example, from a period of rapid growth after the 
Second World War to  the oil shocks of the 1970s, saturating world markets, changing 
industrial structure, increasing national debt in many quarters of the world and the 
economic slowdown of the last decade. For the time being we can only observe that the 
particular circumstances change from one long wave to another, but that  the sequence of 
fluctuations and structural changes a t  a higher level of abstraction indicate a striking 
regularity. Thus, the symmetry is destroyed in the transition from a sequence of 
replacements and fluctuations to particular circumstances and individual events. In other 
words, the individual event, such as an innovation, is unique, but the pattern of change 
appears to be regular for the emergence of innovations taken together as a dynamic process. 
The annals of business cycles (see, for example, Thorp and Mitchell 1926, and 
Mitchell 1927) show that the severe crises or so-called Great Depressions occur regularly 
during the downswing of the long waves. It suffices here to  mention the Great Depressions 
and financial panics of 1819, 1874 and 1929 in the United States that  with small variance 
occurred throughout the rest of the world. This immediately suggests an obvious historical 
manifestation of the prolonged periods of stagnation, but this does not answer the question 
whether these Great Depressions are a necessary characteristic of the downswing. 
Synchronization and Recurrence 
The analysis of technological substitution in steel production, energy consumption and 
transport infrastructures showed that  the same basic approach can be applied to describe 
the structural changes. In all three cases older technologies were replaced by new ones with 
regular recurring patterns. Besides the now obvious similarity in the substitution patterns, 
it should be observed that  the timing of the saturation phases is to  some degree 
synchronized in the three examples. 
In all three cases technologies that have saturated before 1850 (canals, crucible and 
puddle steel, and fuelwood) are declining, although a t  different rates. The next "wave" of 
technologies to reach saturation in terms of market shares between 1870 and 1875 are 
railways, Bessemer steel and animal feed as a source of energy. During the 1920s coal 
saturated, in 1950 open hearth steel, in 1970 length of roads and oil technologies, and 1980 
oxygen steel. This indicates that  the saturation periods measured in terms of relative 
market shares are not perfectly aligned, but that  they are grouped around the upper 
turning points in the long wave as indicated by price fluctuations (see Figure 4). What is 
more important however is that  during period of saturation of some technologies and 
prolonged economic recession, the next generation of growing technologies surpasses the 
declining ones, e.g. crucible and puddle steel by open hearth process, canals by roads, 
fuelwood by oil and gas, railroads by airways and Bessemer by electric and oxygen steel. 
This illustrates that  the periods of prolonged recession are indeed periods of structural 
change when dominating technologies are either close to  saturation or are already declining 
and when older declining technologies are surpassed by the newly emerged ones. Another 
way of stating this symmetry is that  the dominating technology in each of these examples 
bridges the period between the end of growth in one wave and the beginning of growth in 
the next as its market shares curve from increase through saturation to  decline. 
A possible explanation of this similarity in the substitution patterns is that  the 
specific changes that  led to  the replacement of old by new technologies and energy sources 
were interrelated. For example, the new steel processes and transport infrastructures were 
dependent on new energy technologies. On the other hand, the new energy sources could 
only be developed with increased intensity of energy use, such as in the new industrial and 
urban complexes that  emerged as the availability of transport possibilities and basic 
materials increased (symbolized here by transport infrastructures and steel production). 
This kind of interdependent lacing of technological development and growth of demand 
indicates that  a certain degree of synchronization in the substitution processes could be 
expected. This of course still leaves the question of the precise nature of the 50-year time 
constant unanswered. Since we have already shown that the three substitution processes 
appear to portray similar features and relatively close the timing of crucial market 
saturation and takeover events, we will now consider the timing of long wave fluctuations 
and energy substitution. 
Figure 30 shows energy substitution (from Figure 25) on the lower plot and long wave 
in energy consumption, energy intensity and wholesale prices (from Figures 4 and 27) on 
the upper plot. Here we have implicitly assumed that  energy substitution is indicative of 
other replacement processes because the timing of saturation periods, introduction of new 
energy sources and Ats  are perfectly symmetrical in this example. Thus, Figure 30 
summarizes the results of the phenomenological analysis of the dynamics of technology and 
long waves. A careful examination of the timing and patterns of changes shows that  they 
are all in tune. The saturation periods of energy technologies coincide with the peaks in 
prices and energy intensity. The period of decline from saturation to  loss of dominance (i.e. 
loss of the highest market shares) lasts on the order of 25 years, or about as long as the 
downswing phase of the long wave which is characterized in Figure 30 by the fluctuations of 
energy consumption, intensity and the price index. By symmetry, the upswing of the long 
wave is paralleled by the growth of the new energy source from newly acquired dominance 
t o  saturation. 
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Figure 30 Long Waves and Substitution Dynamics, US. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A number of important technologies and growth sectors emerge within relatively short 
periods of time, they expand because they are interrelated, and they enhance each other 
because they are interlaced and interdependent. Long waves emerge because the 
replacement. of old technologies and methods, and the growth of new ones takes place 
simultaneously, leading to  a prolonged phase of economic growth. Likewise, these 
replacements and growth processes tend to  saturate during relatively short periods of time 
resulting in prolonged recession and turbulence, restructuring of the economy and 
technological and social change. 
The prolonged recession period reduces economic opportunities, and also leads to  
excess production capacities, unemployment and lower intensity of other factor inputs. 
This change in the economic environment from relatively continuous growth t o  stagnation, 
recession and turbulence makes the application of financial innovations attractive as other 
opportunities for return on capital decline. The prolonged stagnation and recession period 
is characterized by volatility and expansion of speculative instruments, and decline in 
productive investments. As volatility increases so do the risks and it is conceivable that 
this diverts some capital and human resurces into innovative activities. 
Some evidence exists that innovations cluster around the recession periods and 
eventually lead to a new "wave" of replacements and growth. This basic pattern can recur 
and be repeated in completely different circumstances provided that  the growth of a 
number of important technologies is to  an extent synchronized. All that  is necessary is 
that  we can distinguish between periods of growth and periods of change. This hypothesis 
does not require a high degree of synchronization or "focusing" for either the innovation 
clusters or for the saturation clusters. It is sufficient that  a number of important 
replacements take place and cause a period of prolonged growth. Certainly this is a very 
simplistic and stylized scheme of technological change and economic and social 
development, but it is supported by the empirical evidence of technological substitution in 
energy, steel and transport and in the overall price movements. This evidence supports the 
existence of weak clusters in the growth phases of different technologies, and perhaps 
weaker evidence for saturation clusters. A larger "sample" of case studies would be 
required to confirm this result in the statistical sense. For the time being it is not clear 
whether the phenomenological evidence is representative enough to  allow greneralization of 
the results or not. The example of primary energy substitution in the United States (see 
Figure 25) is remarkable in that is portrays a perfect symmetry of introduction, growth and 
saturation of technologies and price movements over a period of almost two centuries. 
The fact that  some of the events that  characterize profound changes in technology and 
economic structure occur in tune is striking, but it leaves many questions open. For 
instance, we have observed that  technological replacements in steel production and 
transport infrastructures do  not portray perfectly symmetrical patterns as primary energy 
substitution. This means that  technologies saturate in broad waves that  start  a t  end of the 
prosperity phase and extend to  the beginning of the next Kondratieff wave. Perhaps this is 
an artifact of the choice of technological substitution processes in that  they are very closely 
related to each other and represent the most important growth sectors. Yet, given the 
sparse statistical records, it is difficult to  find other examples that  span equivalent 
historical periods. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the energy system and related infrastructural 
developments appears to be crucial with respect to the observed pulses in economic 
activity. For example, the construction of great canals throughout Europe and the United 
States during the 18th and beginning of the 19th century was initiated by the ever 
increasing need to transport timber and other goods in larger quantities over longer 
distances. Later, railroads were associated with a similar boom period basically due to  the 
same reasons - the concentration of production in urban are- required a more efficient 
transport system that  also helped in the acquisition of new and larger markets. Thus, 
canals and railroads expanded existing markets and "created" new ones for new products. 
In terms of the energy system, large canals were associated with the transport of fuel wood 
which a t  that time was the primary source of energy for many industrial activities such as 
iron smelting. The railroad era was very closely related t o  the widespread diffusion of steel, 
steam and coal related industries. 
In terms of the long wave fluctuations, we will name the upswing phase from 1773 to 
1810 the "age of canals" and the upswing from 1840 t o  1869 the "age of railroads". 
Accordingly, we name the upswing from 1895 to  1920 the "age of electricity" because of its 
significant contribution to  the rapid development of new industries and communication 
technologies. The last upswing, from 1945 to  the 1970s, we symbolically identify with 
motor vehicles, roads, aircraft and petrochemical industries. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to time this last turning point with any precision, but in view of the empirical 
evidence in the synchronization of technological substitution processes, energy efficiency 
and other indicators, it  probably occurred after the "oil crises" of the early 1970s which 
marked the saturation of crude oil and its eventual replacement as the dominant source of 
primary energy. Let us assume, for the sake of naming a particular reference year, that it 
in fact occurred in 1973. If this were actually the case, and assuming the continuation of 
the long wave fluctuations, the next turning point could be expected sometime around the 
turn of the century. Going further into the future, on the basis of this scheme the following 
upswing phase could be expected to last until the 2030s. 
The overall picture that  emerges suggests that  each upswing phase is associated with 
large infrastructural development. This development first opens many new product and 
factor markets and toward the end of the prosperity phase leads t o  eventual saturation of 
these markets and full adoption of the technologies that  were introduced during the 
recovery period. This was the process that occurred between the end of the Second World 
War and the initiation of a downswing five to ten years ago. Some of the developments of 
the current downswing period we can already anticipate. For example, the energy intensity 
curve in Figure 27 indicates that during this and the next decades we can anticipate further 
relative improvements in the energy efficiency of the economy (i.e., reductions in the 
amount of primary energy consumed per monetary unit of gross national product in real 
terms). Thus, we can expect further dissemination of energy efficient technologies and 
institutional measures during the downswing phase until the end of the century. As far as 
energy technologies are concerned, the market penetration analysis suggests natural gas as 
the best candidate for eventual dominance as the major energy source during the upswing 
period after the 1990s. Natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel and from that perspective 
alone it is attractive. It could also become a very efficient source of electricity and clean 
fuels. Widespread use of natural gas would require new infrastructures for production, 
long-distance transport (e.g. by superconductive cables), conversion to  fuels and 
electricity, and distribution to  the final consumer. Thus, construction of large grids and 
new industries based on natural gas would be required. Another growth sector discussed in 
terms of technological change are transport systems and infrastructures. One possible 
development could be an advanced aircraft with substantively higher productivity than the 
Boeing 747. It could be either a super large subsonic transport, a cruise supersonic or a 
hypersonic spaceplane. In any case, such advanced means of transport would require new 
infrastructures, such as airports and "feeder" aircraft, and other transport modes to  and 
from airports. Cruise supersonic and hypersonic transports would also require new sources 
of energy and new materials. Methane and hydrogen are obvious candidates to replace 
kerosine, so that  the coupling to natural gas is obvious. It is analogous to  the simultaneous 
development of the perochemical and automobile industries. New materials are related to 
a possible replacement for the saturating steel industry, which in the long run will have to 
expand to  other materials as recycled steel and the electric process exhaust their market 
potentials. 
These are just some of the poasible candidates, but they are consistent with the 
apparent requirements that  emerge from the overall pattern of economic pulses and 
technological subt i tu t ion dynamics since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. 
Before these and other new technologies could expand during the next upswing, the next 
decades would bring a period of renewal and "gales of creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 
1935). A period of rapid (relative) deflation can be expected together with prolonged 
unemployment and further economic slowdown. These are the selection mechanisms that  
in the past distilled the successful from a wide range of promising new technologies and 
entrepreneurial innovations. The existing patterns will have to  be destroyed before new 
ones can emerge and their destruction will mark the beginning of renewal and a promise of 
prosperity. 
Most of these speculations about the nature and timing of future events is based on 
the dynamics of equivalent changes in the past. The perfect symmetry between changes in 
the primary energy and price fluctuations shows that  certainly price mechanism alone 
cannot explain all of the dynamic changes. The secular trends in prices are however 
consistent with the structural changes in energy. There is an intertemporal price elasticity 
of energy use. As prices increase energy is saved (intensity decreases) and new energy 
sources are introduced. In some way prices appear t o  have short range as a "force" in a 
dynamic economy. Savings are introduced in the face of a recession, but they only create 
unemployment and excess capacities. It is the innovations that  can "tunnel" through the 
Kondratieff "barrier" and create a new period of growth. From a large number of 
innovative activities only a few are successful, most of them cannot escape from the 
recession and decline. In the past the few successful innovations were important enough t o  
create a new period of growth. Thus, from the dynamic perspective prices appear to have a 
shorter range while innovations have little importance in the short run, but are of 
fundamental importance over periods longer than the business and the inventory cycles. 
This illustrates why the Kondratieff wave is a long cycle, but perhaps the most 
important question is why the clock that  tunes such events as the dynamic changes in 
technology and long waves in economic activity operates on a 50-year scale. Since we have 
shown that  the events that  mark structural changes are synchronized and follow a logical 
order, the question of the time-scale and invariance is crucial. If it were answered all the 
other events, since they occur in logical order apparently as required, would fit the grand 
pattern like pieces of a puzzle. 
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